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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT CSS (PROV)
APO 534, U. S. ARMY

26 October 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Director, Office of Strategic Services ONLY

SUBJECT: Plan for prevention of enemy withdrawal in
Balkans and Yugoslavia

1. The attached outline was picked up by our unit at Bari, and after being reviewed by our Planning and Operations Committee, it is forwarded to you for your attention.
2. Since this was procured out of channels, it is recommended that it not be given any distribution or be shown to the British.
3. This is not an official or an approved plan; it merely portrays what is in the back of the minds of some of the better informed British officers. And it is furnished to you only to show the trend of British thinking.

EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry

Incl.

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22/7/140

17 Oct 44.

REAR HQ 'M' MILITARY MISSION

APPRECIATION OF THE BEST METHOD OF PREVENTING THE
ENEMY'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SOUTHERN BALKANS AND
JUGOSLAVIA

OBJECT

To supply immediately sufficient military eqpt to JANL forces
to enable them to take advantage of the enemy's present plight by:-

- (a) Destroying his few existing rail comms.
- (b) Disrupting his rd comms and creating blocks, thereby presenting
the best possible targets for the Allied Air Forces.
- (c) Prevent his withdrawal to HUNGARY, the Greater Reich or NE ITALY.
- (d) To bring about the final annihilation of the enemy forces involved.

FACTORS1. Time and Space

- (a) The enemy has now decided to carry out a total withdrawal from
the Southern Balkans and to effect this the majority of his
forces MUST pass through areas that can be attacked by JANL
forces.
- (b) The enemy is taking advantage of the few escape routes that
remain open to him and is making great efforts to break through
the lightly armed Partisan forces in these areas.

Deductions. JANL Forces in these areas should IMMEDIATELY be given
the necessary eqpt to enable them to close and keep
closed these escape routes.

2. Allied Air Attacks

Constant air attacks on enemy tpt during operations "BATWEEK"
and "HELIUM" forced him to move his larger MT cols only by night.
Profiting by the darkness, JANL consistently carried out attacks
on the above with great success.

Deductions.

- (a) It is more than reasonable to suppose that the same
conditions will prevail during forthcoming operations
if the same tempo of air attack is maintained.

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- (b) Many blocks on both rail and rd comm and the subsequent piling up of MT and rolling stock may be expected.
- (c) A considerable number of excellent targets will present themselves, which should be exploited to the fullest.
- (d) Continual fear of air attack may have an overwhelming effect on him, and force otherwise determined tps to surrender to JANL. He therefore must be given no respite.

3. Speed of Russian Advance

- (a) Russian and Bulgarian forces in EAST SERBIA have now occupied the greater part of the line SKOPLJE - BELGRADE and will shortly reach the IBAR Valley line.
- (b) Russian tps NORTH of BELGRADE have crossed the River TIZA in force, cut the line BELGRADE - BUDAPEST and are advancing westwards through the BACKA.
- (c) Inside HUNGARY Russian forces are moving westwards in great strength towards BUDAPEST and the DANUBE. Hungarian resistance is weakening.

Deductions.

- (a) It is probable that within one week KRALJEVO and the IBAR Valley line will be in Russian hands and therefore denied to the Germans as an escape route. The capture of SKOPLJE by Bulgar and Partisan forces is possible.
- (b) Russian tps NORTH of BELGRADE are likely to advance westwards and within two weeks cut the main line BELGRADE - ZAGREB, WEST of BELGRADE, and possibly WEST of BROD, denying the SARAJEVO - BROD escape route to the enemy.
- (c) The advance of the Russian tps into western HUNGARY will deny the escape routes through OSIJEK, KOPRIVNICA, VARAZDIN And other Slavonian rlys to the Germans.
- (d) As a result the German forces in the course of their evacuation will be forced to depend more and more on the coastal rds of MONTENEGRO, DALMATIA and CROATIA, and on the rds and rlys through SLOVENIA to AUSTRIA and NE ITALY.

4. Sea Supplies

- (a) A large tonnage is now available for infiltration by sea. It is estimated that this will be possible shortly.

Deduction. This will greatly facilitate JANL in cutting the coast rd which has become a vital escape route.

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(b) Owing to present shortage, it is doubtful if shipping can always be made available for the above, as and when the opportunity presents itself.

Deductions. This method of tptn cannot be relied upon and an air lift to the coastal areas must therefore be planned for.

(c) There is no doubt that a firmly held bridgehead would enable us to run in such supplies and by eqpt as would enable JAML forces to block the coast rd effectively, and subsequently we should be in a position to maintain them if the necessary shipping was available.

Deduction. GHQ JAML should be asked to make an all out effort to reach and hold an area of the coast, and sufficient shipping should be immediately at hand to tpt the necessary stores and maintenance.

(d) The enemy has appreciated the necessity of keeping open the coast rd as an escape route.

Deduction. He may therefore be expected to react violently to any such operation.

5. Escape Routes open to the enemy.

(A) Rail

1. Routes in SE JUGOSLAVIA

(a) VELES - SKOPLJE - NIS - LAPOVO - BELGRADE.

This route is subject to Partisan attack between VELES and SKOPLJE, from thence to the NORTH it is either in Allied hands or has been rendered irreparable.

Deduction. This route cannot be used by the enemy.

(b) VELES - SKOPLJE - KRALJEVO

Route is subject to attack by Partisans, though mainly held by the enemy.

Deduction. Delays on this line are possible; the enemy however is able however to use this section by force, although the use he can make of it is limited by (c) and (d) below.

(c) KRALJEVO - LAPOVO - BELGRADE

Large sections of this route are in Allied hands.

Deduction. Further use of this line is denied the enemy.

(d) KRALJEVO - UZICE - VISOKOGRAD - SARAJEVO

The central portion of this line has been subject to

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Partisan attacks and is at present held by Partisan forces.

Deduction. Given sufficient support in arms, amn and explosives, by intensification of attacks the enemy can be denied the use of this line.

General Deduction.

Concerted attacks on route KRALJEVO - SARAJEVO can prevent effective rail movement in SE JUGOSLAVIA.

2. Routes in Central JUGOSLAVIA

(a) SARAJEVO - DOBOJ - BROD

Route is at present being used by the enemy with limited interference; it contains, however, a considerable number of engineering works which lay it open to attack.

Deduction. Although force would be required to deny this route to the enemy, continued attack upon engineering works would effectively close this route.

(b) SARAJEVO - SRMETICA - PRIJEDOR - BOSNOVI - SUMJA

The greater portion of this route is in the hands of the Partisans who are operating the rly.

Deduction. Provided that the Partisans can maintain their present hold by force of arms, this route can be denied the enemy.

(c) BELGRADE - VINKOVCI - BROD - NOVSKA - ZAGREB

The eastern portion of this route is under the threat of the advancing Allied forces. The remainder of the route is being operated by the enemy with periodic Partisan interference, which with the exception of the southern alternative link between NOVSKA and ZAGREB is limited by the lack of any but small engineering works.

Deduction. This route can only be denied the enemy by repeated Partisan attacks.

3. Routes in NORTH JUGOSLAVIA

(a) NORTH WEST

(1) FIUME-OGULIN)
SPLIT - KNIN - OGULIN) KARLOVAC - ZAGREB.

The SPLIT - OGULIN section has been irreparably damaged and is in Partisan hands. The FIUME - OGULIN section has been subject to repeated

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Partisan attacks and known traffic is very limited. The route from OGULIN to ZAGREB has been maintained by the enemy by force of arms, subject to frequent interruptions by Partisan attacks; there are a number of engineering works on this line.

Deduction. The effectiveness of these as routes from the coast, where not already so, could be denied the enemy by further attacks in force.

(ii) TRIESTE - LJUBLJANA - ZIDANI MOST - ZAGREB

With the exception of a break at LITIJA owing to damage to the br, this extremely heavily guarded line has been opened to traffic in spite of ground and air attacks.

Deduction. This line can only be denied the enemy by full scale attacks upon large engineering works.

(iii) LJUBLJANA - JESINICE

The enemy has been operating this line with very few breaks, although engineering works exist.

Deduction. Denial to the enemy can only be obtained by ground forces if the Partisan forces available are fully supported with arms, amn and explosives.

(iv) ZIDANI MOST - CELJE (DRAVOGRAD
(PRAGERSKO - MARIBOR

With the exception of the CELJE - DRAVOGRAD section all of these routes are in heavy use by the enemy, the former section being out of use from damage to engineering works. These lines combined with the link MARIBOR - DRAVOGRAD formed the life lines of comms with AUSTRIA.

Deduction. The enemy is likely to make every effort to maintain these comms which can only be broken against stiff resistance. The effectiveness of these routes could equally be reduced by attack between JUDENBURG - KLAGENFURT and JUDENBURG - DRAVOGRAD combined with ZIDANI MOST - CELJE.

(b) NORTH EAST

(i) ZAGREB - KRIZEVCI - KOPRIVINICA. This line is at present not in action owing to damage to track by Partisans, although there are indications that the enemy intends to repair and use this line.

Deductions. Without further attacks, this line will be opened as an escape route.

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(11) BANOVA JARUGA - VIROVITICA - MARGA.

This line is completely out of action owing to damage which has not been repaired.

Deduction. The enemy is unlikely to repair this line.

(11i) BATRINA - MASICE - OSIJEK and VINKOVCI - OSIJEK

The former route is open and in use in part; the latter route is open and there are indications that these routes are to be maintained.

Deduction. The enemy can only be denied more routes by continued attacks.

(B) Roads

General.

1. With the exception of certain individual stretches of rd, the enemy is able to open up essential routes by force of arms.

2. The general routes northwest open to him are as follows :-

(a) Dalmatian Coast routes: PEC - CETINJE - DUBROVNIK - SPLIT - GOSPIC - FIUME - LJUBLJANA - KLAGENFURT.

(b) PRISTINA - VISEGRAD - SARAJEVO - BIRAC - KARLOVAC - LJUBLJANA - KLAGENFURT.

(c) KRALJEVO - ZVORNIK - DOBOJ - BANJALUKA - ZAGREB - MARIBOR.

3. The rds NORTH are as follows :-

(a) BERANE - LOZNICA - OSIJEK

(b) METKOVIC - SARAJEVO - DOBOJ - OSIJEK

(c) METKOVIC - MOSTAR - BANJALUKA - VIROVITICA

(d) BENKOVAC - BRINJE - KARLOVAC - ZAGREB - VARAZDIN

Deduction. The network of rds is such that the enemy can only be prevented from access to the routes by being confronted by an armed force with the necessary support weapons and by the extensive use of minefields.

NB. The JANL have consistently proved themselves able to make the maximum use of A Tk mines to the best effect.

6. Forces Involved.

(a) Enemy.

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These consist of the equivalent of some 14/16 divs of varying categories in JUGOSLAVIA, as well as large number of tps trying to escape northwards from GREECE and ALBANIA. A rough total of enemy tps SOUTH and EAST of an approx line BELGRADE - DUBROVNIK may be given as 300,000 with approx an additional 150,000 NORTH and WEST of this line. Thus there are about 450,000 German tps either in JUGOSLAVIA, or who must pass through JUGOSLAVIA.

(b) JANL Forces.

These consist of the following :-
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 and 11 Corps; forces under HQ MACEDONIA and forces under HQ 4 ZONE.

These forces total approx 140,000 men, without taking account of the many cadres and independent bdes, which probably bring the total to above 200,000

(For enemy and JANL strengths and locations see trace at Appx. 'C')

Large tracts of territory are effectively controlled by JANL fms. These tps are mostly well equipped with small arms, and although they have relatively few heavy weapons with which to hold a determined enemy with superior armament, they have proved that they can carry out excellent attacks on rd and rail comms.

Deduction. Given increased and carefully selected material aid, JANL can play a very large part in the annihilation of enemy forces in the Balkans.

7. Believed Enemy Intentions

It is believed, on reliable evidence, that during the course of his withdrawal the enemy will attempt to hold a series of three or four delaying lines. These will probably be, first, in southern MONTENEGRO, and northern ALBANIA, then in the Dalmatian hinterland and then in NW CROATIA, and finally in northern SLOVENIA and southern AUSTRIA.

Deduction. JANL forces other than those in the areas of the immediate bottlenecks will be well placed to carry out sustained attacks on enemy L of C, and should receive increased material support accordingly.

8. Supplies required by the JANL

Food supply.

In a detailed appreciation written in Aug it was estimated that the JANL required a total of 2007 tons of stores per month by air, as a reasonable minimum for maintenance and upkeep of fms in existence at that time. During Jul, Aug and Sep approx tonnages delivered were 1395, 1139 and 811 respectively. During the first fifteen days of Oct only 140 tons were flown.

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Deduction. It is clear therefore that the JANL has had no opportunity to establish reserves and that it must be inadequately equipped for sustained intensive resistance.

9. Immediate Requirements.

The points to be borne in mind generally in relation to the immediate requirements of the JANL are :-

The absence of reserves.
The approach of winter.

The fact that they are being asked to accomplish more than can be attained by normal guerilla tps - namely to hold and destroy organized enemy fans.

Deductions.

(a) This implies that the following must be included in any estimate of immediate requirements :-

(i) All outstanding demands for small arms and SAA plus additional explosives and A tk mines.

(ii) Clothing and boots.

(iii) Any hy eqpt that can be sent incl A tk weapons, arty, tpt.

(b) Based on the above, estimated immediate requirements of the JANL are set out in Appx 'A'.

(c) The total lift required is 1270 tons nett, of which 370 tons nett must be landed. See footnote at Appx 'A'.

10. Maintenance

Experience has shown that if the impetus of initial attacks is to be maintained a quick and substantial follow up is required.

Deductions.

(a) Therefore, although the figure of sorties for maintenance will be considerably lower than that for initial attacks, it will be high compared with previous commitments.

(b) 100 sorties per month will be required to maintain A tk guns, arty and jeeps incl in Appx 'A', and considerable increase in expenditure of explosives and amn must be foreseen.

11. Availability

All supplies contained in Appx 'A' are available either in SOM depots or in the 8000 ton dump recently released by PHU.

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12. Consideration of the Flying Problems involved.(a) Weather.

It must be accepted that from now on the weather will deteriorate steadily. More sorties will be cancelled before takeoff. There will be more failures due to bad weather of A/C that do take off. The MOON factor is almost negligible in so far as it cannot effect pinpoints or well established LGs. Where the state of the moon is important is in the initial sorties to new LGs. The moon is adequately strong for this approx 27 Oct.

(b) Sorties necessary to carry immediate requirements.

(i) Time available for delivery. For the purpose of this paragraph it is estimated that immediate requirements should be delivered within 3 weeks.

(ii) Number of nights actual flying. It is considered that out of 22 nights there is likely to be flying on 11 nights.

(iii) Number of failures on a flying night. Local met conditions over the target area are likely to cause the failure of 50% of the A/C airborne.

Deduction. If the target figure to be flown within 3 weeks is 1270 tons nett, a steady average of 232 tons nett of air freight must be available on each night of good weather.

(c) Availability of Landing Grounds.

The following have no LGs in operation at present :- 3, 8 and 9 Corps and 4 Zone. Of these: 3 Corps can re-open a LG recently suspended. SLOVENE HQ should be approached concerning overland tptn for 9 Corps and 4 Zone. Landings by day are practicable to 8 Corps. The number of A/C that can be accommodated by each landing ground per flying night is 8.

(d) Of the Corps with LGs, 6 and 10 Corps should be instructed to receive alternative LGs as their present ones are liable to become unserviceable.

Deduction. Total night landing sorties which could be absorbed by the field in the 3 week period is 480. This is based :-

(i) On flying successes on alternate nights only.

(ii) 50% met failures on flying nights.

Therefore the landing of 370 tons nett is practicable.

Thereafter from the field point of view 720 successful landings per month are possible.

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(e) Availability of Pinpoints

Within the 12 Corps areas concerned approx 25 dropping zones are open at present. Total numbers vary daily, but this is an average figure excl LGs - each of which can be used as a DZ, when landing ops are not taking place. Each DZ is capable of receiving 8 loads nightly. Using figures given in sub-paras (b) (ii) and (iii) above, present pinpoints can absorb 100 successful drops every other night, or a total of 1100 successful drops in the 3 week period.

Deduction. There will be no difficulty from the fields point of view in receiving drops amounting to 900 tons nett.

(f) Conclusion

It is clear therefore that so far as the field is concerned the problem of reception is capable of easy solution.

13. Courses open to the enemy withdrawing from Southern Balkans

(a) The enemy intention now is clearly to evacuate all his forces gradually from the southern Balkans through JUGOSLAVIA, and at the same time to prevent himself being outflanked by the advancing Russian forces or by an Allied landing at any point of the coast.

(b) Courses open therefore only amount to a choice of three main escape routes for his forces moving up from the SOUTH and timing of his ultimate evacuation from the coast.

(c) These main escape routes are :-

(i) PRISTINA - MITROVICA - KRALJEVO and thence westward.

(ii) PRIZREN - PEC - PODGORICA and thence NW up the coast rd.

(iii) PRISTINA - MITROVICA - NOVI PAZAR - PRIJEPOLJE - SARAJEVO.

(d) On each of these routes subsequent movement will depend on the denial or otherwise by the Russians of further escape routes into HUNGARY.

The present rate of Russian advance makes his withdrawal into HUNGARY improbable, and he will consequently be forced into AUSTRIA or NE ITALY via SLOVENIA or NW CROATIA, which are the last obstacles in the way of his escape.

14. Courses open to ourselves

(a) To concentrate essential supplies only to those areas where bottlenecks can be created, i.e., SW MONTENEGRO and the SLOVENE - AUSTRIAN and CROATIAN - ISTRIAN borders.

These bottlenecks are few, and unless immediate action is taken in supplying JAWL forces in these areas the enemy may well pass comparatively unmolested through them. However, this will allow many of

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the enemy to pass through large areas without being subject to maximum ground attack.

(b) To send as many stores as are needed to ALL areas through which the enemy must pass, thus subjecting him to incessant attacks by JANL forces, AS WELL as making possible the creation of the inevitable bottle-necks.

(c) In order to achieve the annihilation of the maximum No of Germans the 2nd course should be carried out.
- JANL fms involved will be: -2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 and 11 Corps and HQ 4th ZONE.

15. PLAN

General

(a) Marshal TITO should be approached immediately and asked to implement this plan, which he will undoubtedly do.

(b) Unlike RATWEEK there is no reason why JANL WT links should not be used on security grounds, and therefore all the necessary orders can be despatched direct from the Marshal's HQ rather than by this HQ.

(c) For detailed plan of JANL fms concerned, priorities of flying and targets which are subject for attack see Appx B att.

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Form 10 (Rev. 1/42)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE May 9, 1944 REC'D 5/9/44 5:24 p.m.

TO

GUSTAV, CAIRO

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, MAGNETIC, X-2,
SCHIEBER, WEIHO

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Corrected copy filed under book
#52621. 109 for East or Toulmin alone.

On the 17th of last month, the Office of the Minister Resident
in Military Division, 930, MEV, announced to USAFIME in communication
101/40/13 that the following organizations have been formulated, under
authority of SACMEX: (1) a Committee on Balkan Affairs, (2) a Sub-Com-
mittee on Balkan Operations, and (3) a Sub-Committee on Balkan Relief,
which will take the place, respectively, of (1) the Committee on Middle
East Affairs, to the extent to which it is acted upon in the Balkans,
(2) the Special Operations and Special Operations and Special Operations
Working Committee, and (3) the Committee on Administration of Territories
in the Balkans. On the 26th of last month, was sent to the Dept. of
State by MacVeagh, a cable containing the text of this letter. Two days
later we sent a cable containing the text of HQ USAFIME's reply, dated
the 28th of last month, which designated the Service to sit on the com-
mittees as observers and proposed that representation also be given to
the Office of War Information.

Kindly read these communications over carefully. You are not
to initiate any action toward obtaining representation of the OSS. We
intend to notify you further after having consulted the State Dept.
Under no circumstances are you to commit the Office of Strategic Services
in any way whatsoever.

*Bellman 14, 45-4**X. Balkan Affairs Committee*

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14 5/9/44 7:00 P.M.

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111

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARY AT

AIR MAIL

Date: April 27, 1944

From: American Embassy
Cairo, Egypt

Date: April 27, 1944

Received: April 27, 1944

STORY

Secretary of State
Washington

A-67 April 27, 1944, 4:30 PM

A-64 April 25, 2 PM

The following is the text of the reply dated April 26, 1944, transmitted by US AIR 3 to the communication from the British Resident in Cairo concerning the establishment of a Balkan Affairs Committee and two sub-committees, quoted in my airmail under reference.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 26, 1944

Cairo, Egypt
16 April 1944

Subject: Balkan Affairs Committee

Secretary, Middle East Reference Committee
Office of the Minister Resident
Military Division, CPO, Cairo

Receipt is acknowledged of letter subject as above
dated April 15, dated April 17, 1944.

On the Balkan Affairs Committee, a service unit
has been organized in the status of observer. One
representative of the Office of the Commanding General
USMC and the International Division, Headquarters, USMC, will
attend the various meetings.

Representation on the Balkan Operations Sub-committee
will remain as has been on the former Balkan Operations
Committee and Special Operations Planning Committee.

2

2-37, April 27, 1944

From: American Embassy near
Government of Greece,
Cairo.POINT

4. U. S. Service representatives on the Balkan Relief Sub-Committee will attend in the status of observers only. Representatives of the International Division, Headquarters, USAFME, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Headquarters, USAFME, will attend.

5. Notice of meetings, minutes, etc., of the Balkan Affairs Committee and Balkan Relief Sub-committee should be sent to the International Division of this Headquarters. Those of the Balkan operations Sub-committee should be sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, USAFME.

6. It is suggested that the Office of War Information be represented on the various committees that are being formed.

7. This is to advise that there are no senior U. S. Army, Air Force or U. S. Navy representatives in the positions as implied by the terms of reference of the various committees. The only U. S. service representation will be by USAFME.

8. If the terms of reference of the various committees are changed or further directives are received by this headquarters, the U. S. services' position on this matter will be reviewed.

For the Commanding General:

CLYDE D. KEITH
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

MacVeagh

Hand

Dispatched April 24, 1944.

From: American Embassy to
Cairo, Egypt.

Date: April 23, 1944

(Received)

Secretary of State,
Washington

✓-34, April 25, 1944, 2 pm

In reference to my telegram no 124, April 21, 6 pm, I quote below the text of the communication no. 14/40/13 of April 17, 1944, together with its enclosures, from the Office of the British Minister Resident to the Commanding General, BAEF, concerning the establishment of a Balkan Affairs Committee, and its sub-committees for Operations and Relief. The text of the reply of USAFIM thereto has not yet been made available to the Embassy but will be transmitted as soon as received. My latest information, given me by the Chief of Staff personally today, is to the effect that USAFIM will reply that it is authorized to attend meetings of the Balkan Affairs Committee and the Balkan Relief Committee in an observational capacity only. As it has been represented on the previously existing Special Operations Committee, it will continue to be represented on the sub-committee now set up to replace that body.

Subject: BALKAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Office of the Minister
Resident (AE) Military
Division, BAEF
Tel no. 17, 702

Ref: 14/40/13

17th April, 1944

Commanding General,
BAEF

Under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, there have been set up in the Middle East the following Committees:-

- (a) Balkan Affairs Committee
- (b) Balkan Operations Sub-committee
- (c) Balkan Relief Sub-committee

The Composition and Terms of Reference of these Committees are set out in Appendices A, B and C to this letter.

3. Balkan

From: American Embassy
to Greece

-34, April 2, 1944

3. Balkan Affairs Committee

It should be noted that for the conduct of affairs in the Balkans this Committee will replace the Middle East Defence Committee though the latter will continue to function as regards matters which affect only the Middle East.

4. Balkan Operations Sub-committee

This committee replaces the existing Special Operations Committee and the Special Operations Working Committee.

5. Balkan Relief Sub-committee

This Committee replaces the existing Administration of Territories in the Balkans Committee.

It is very much hoped that it will eventually be possible to have full American representation on these Committees. At present it is understood that Service representation only has been agreed by the American authorities, and the composition of the Committees has been adjusted on this basis. It is proposed that American political and economic representatives should be invited to attend meetings as observers.

The original intention was that the Secretariat for the Committees should be provided by and form part of the Middle East Defence Committee Secretariat, but that an American representative should attend the meetings and assist in the drafting and agreeing of minutes. If you decide that you would like to appoint such a representative we shall be very glad of his help.

I would be grateful if you could let me know in due course to whom I should send notices of meetings, minutes, etc., and who should act as American representatives for the Services on these Committees.

/s/ H. G. Curran
t/ (H. G. CURRAN)
Colonel

Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee.

34, April 5, 1944

From: [illegible]
To: Greece

SECRETARY

1. COMPOSITION

- Minister Resident in the Middle East - Chairman
- Flag Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean (or his nominee)
- Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces (or his nominee)
- Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East (or his nominee)
- U.S. Ambassador to Greece
- U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia (or his nominee)
- Mr. G. E. Steel
- Senior Officer of the United States Navy in the Middle East
- Commanding General, USAFME
- Senior Officer of the United States Army Air Forces in the Middle East
- Head of [illegible]
- Director of Balkan Supply Centre
- Secretary to the Minister Resident in the Middle East.

2. OTHER FUNCTIONS

The Committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for consideration of special problems.

3. THE COMMITTEE

The Committee will transmit information and hereafter appropriate recommendations on Balkan matters to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. Within the terms of policy directives

4

April 23, 1944

From: American Embassy
to Greece

directives received from time to time from Higher Authority, the Committee will coordinate and direct the day to day action to be taken in pursuance of the aims of the United Nations in Greece, (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean), the Dodecanese Islands, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and, for relief matters only, in Yugoslavia and Albania. In carrying out these functions the Committee will have particular regard to:

- a) The activities of Force 133, OSK, and P-1 in relation to the political situation prevailing in these territories.
- b) The necessity for affording the maximum practicable measure of efficient relief to the populations of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece, (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean) when German military occupation of these territories ceases.

The Secretariat will for the present be provided by and from staff of the Secretariat of the Middle East Defence Committee.

ANNEX 1

OPERATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE

MEMBERS

Chief of General Staff (Operations), G-2 - CHAIRMAN
 Colonel, Chief of Staff, Levant and Eastern Mediterranean
 Major, Royal Air Force, Middle East
 Major, Royal Air Force, Middle East
 Major, Royal Air Force, Middle East

Major, Royal Air Force, Middle East
 Major, Royal Air Force, Middle East
 Major, Royal Air Force, Middle East

Major, Royal Air Force, Middle East

Major, Royal Air Force, Middle East

Force 133

-34, April 8, 1944

From: American Embassy
to Greece

Force 133

Office of Strategic Services, Middle East

Political Warfare Executive, Middle East

Office of the Minister Resident in the Middle East

Joint Intelligence Committee, Middle East

Ministry of Economic Warfare, Middle East

2. OTHER REPRESENTATION

The sub-committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for examination of specific problems.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE

(a) The sub-committee will be responsible to the Balkan Affairs Committee for:-

(1) Insuring that the conduct of Special Operations in, and based on, Greece, Crete, the Greek Islands in the Aegean, the Dodecanese Islands, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary and Turkey is consistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government, and the United States Government, conforms to the Directives issued from time to time by the appropriate authorities in the Central Mediterranean, London and Washington, and is properly coordinated.

(1) Coordinating these activities with other military and paramilitary operations, and with political warfare activities, in these territories.

(b) The sub-committee will make recommendations to the Balkan Affairs Committee as necessary for the modification of existing Special Operations policy, and for the formulation of new Special Operations policy affecting the territories enumerated in para (a)(1) above, in the light of changes in the internal situation in these territories.

(c) The

April 5, 1944

From: American Embassy
to Greece

The Sub-committee will dispose of such other questions affecting the Middle East Command as may result from allied operational activities in the territories (other than Turkey) enumerated in para (a)(1) above, except such questions as fall within the scope of the "Balkan Relief Sub-committee". In performing this function the Sub-committee will be guided by the relevant policy directives issued by Higher Authority and will refer questions when necessary to the Balkan Relief Committee for decision.

SECRETARY

The Secretariat will for the present be provided by and form part of the Secretariat of the Middle East Reference Committee.

APPENDIX

MIDDLE EAST SUB-COMMITTEE

1. Allied Military Headquarters (Balkans) - Chairman
2. Chief of the Staff Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean
3. Chief of the Staff Officer Middle East Forces

4. Chief of the Staff Officer Middle East

5. Chief of the Staff Officer to Greece

6. Chief of the Staff Officer to Yugoslavia

7. Chief of the Staff Officer (or his representative)

8. Chief of the Staff Officer in the Middle East

9. Chief of the Staff Officer in the Middle East

10. Chief of the Staff Officer Supply Centre

11. Chief of the Staff Officer Middle East Supply Centre

12. Office of the Minister Resident in the Middle East

2. Other

7

April 20 1964

from American Embassy
to Greece

2. MISSION AND FUNCTION

The Sub-committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for examination of specific problems.

3. FUNCTIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

The Sub-committee will be responsible to the Balkans Affairs Committee for coordinating relief measures (including disposal of refugees) for the benefit of the populations of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean). In carrying out this function the Sub-Committee:-

- (a) Will be guided by such policy directives as are issued from time to time by Higher Authority, by the instructions issued by Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, and by the conclusions of the Balkans Affairs Committee.
- (b) Will have particular regard to:-
 - (i) The procurement and the availability in the Middle East area of adequate relief supplies.
 - (ii) Facilities for transporting relief supplies to the above territories and for discharge and storage on arrival.
 - (iii) Facilities, especially sea and land transportation facilities, for internal distribution of relief supplies on arrival in the above territories.
- (c) Will, as appropriate, consult the interests and the wishes of the Hellenic Greek and Yugoslav Governments through the normal channels.
- (d) Will bear in mind the necessity of ensuring that responsibility for the execution of relief measures in the above territories passes from the Allied military authorities to the civil authorities (Allied and/or indigenous) smoothly and as soon as possible.

4. SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat will for the present be provided by and form part of the Secretariat of the Middle East Defence Committee.

MacVegh

2/nd

Polkman 12 892
x Political Situation
x Economic
x General

29 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am attaching a memorandum on the Balkan situation which I wish you would see gets to the President. Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Cable- 11307. From Gustav Cassio 10/22/43

SECRET

29 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Referring to my previous letters of October 25 and October 28, here is additional information on the Balkan situation. The following refers to the Albanian political situation:

"1. Among both Republicans and Royalists, there abound confidence in the statements made in December, 1942, by Premier Molotov and Secretary of State Hull. However, Foreign Secretary Eden's reservations about boundaries have caused disquiet.

"2. Concerning boundary problems, it is thought that the British, because of their interests in the Balkans, have secretly recognized the persistent claims of Greek representatives in London and Cairo. Albanian claims on Kossova in the North are still made, since the Patriots do not recognize Italian seizure of this region.

"3. Distrust is created by the fact that Albania has not been allowed to join the United Nations. They argue that their acceptance among the United Nations is justified by their guerilla operations which prevented actual Italian occupation. They are irritated by the granting of cobbelligerency status to Italy.

"4. Every party agrees that it is extremely essential for a government to be established. The Republicans desire a National Committee, similar to that of France, under the leadership of Fannoli, in the United States; Mirach Ivanaj at Istanbul; Mithat Frasheri or Mehdi Frasheri, Albanian. The Royalists desire only King Zog. Some Republicans feel that as a final expedient a government which included King Zog would be better than no government at all. But this only with misgivings and as an utter emergency. The popular feeling is certainly not monarchist but democratic.

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"5. Concerning the creation of an Albanian Legion, as in the first World War. Failure of Otto of Austria regarded irrelevant as Albania is not a satellite of the Axis but rather a victim."

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

Balkans 12, 89a
x Political Situation
x Economic
x Paris Cable

29 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum for the
President on the Balkan situation. Would you
please see that he receives it? Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Cable 11297 Am Gustav - Cairo. 10/22/43

SECRET

28 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to my memorandum of October 25th, here is additional information on the Balkan situation:

"1. All political leaders, with the exception of the fighting forces, are regarded apathetically by the people. The fighting forces are composed of two parts - the Cetniks, lead by Mihailovitch, and the Partisans, led by Tito. Nearly all the Cetnik units are east of the Tara and Drina Rivers in old Serbia. Their strength is customarily exaggerated. Their greatest strength is given as 15,000 by the Deputy Commander for Mihailovitch in South Dalmatia, Colonel Zujovich, who came here a short time ago. These men are nearly all Serbians. Disturbances among the population are created by Mihailovitch's title as Yugoslav commander-in-chief and Minister of War, which is obviously opposed to fact.

2. The Partisans are led by Tito, whose true name is Josip Broz. Their official designation is the National Army of Liberation. They are made up of men from every region of the country and they are engaged in hostilities in every part of the country, even including old Serbia. This is in favorable contrast to Mihailovitch's relative lack of activity and narrow field. Each day, Tito's forces are growing. Two Italian divisions, the Garibaldi and the Venetian, joined his forces following the fall of Italy, and added considerably to Tito's supplies. The chief fields of Partisan activities against the Axis are West Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia and Slovenia.

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*3. Included in the political goals of the Partisans is the establishment of a federated Yugoslavia with a government selected by democratic elections. This aim is extremely popular. There is no factual foundation for the allegation of communism made against the Partisans. Such inclinations are found only among a small part of the rank and file or the leaders.

*4. The Government-in-Exile anticipates that Mihailovitch, with assistance from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the present cabinet and with Pan-Serbian inclinations. This is stated in confidence by General Givkovith, Deputy of the King as Commander in Chief, and by Prime Minister Purich. The Government is not representative of the population, and causes controversy between factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes. The people are irritated that the United States and Britain protect the Government-in-Exile. With most of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbians the prestige of Britain has seriously suffered. These people are also firmly against General Givkovith, who, under King Alexander, was Dictator.

*5. Nedich's puppet government in Serbia is extremely disliked and Pavelich in Croatia is spiritedly scorned and hated. Pavelich is backed by his Ustashi militia, a small number of the people and by Nazi military forces.

*6. The United States is considered as reactionary by the Serbians. We are more amicably regarded than are the British, by other Yugoslavs. They expect us to give material support, both during and subsequent to the war, particularly medicines and food, which they vitally require. Tito made a recent complaint

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about the shortage of supplies and has asked that supplies receive priority over the sending of more Allied personnel.

"7. Outside of old Serbia and with the exception of some of the Slovene clericals, who are a tiny part of the Slovenes, the monarchy is quite unpopular today. King Peter is popularly believed to be a youth under the control of political and officer cliques possessing Pan-Serbian inclinations. The population is irritated by the sizeable allowance made to Peter and particularly by his becoming engaged, during the war, to Alexandra.

"8. There is no genuine understanding between the Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Union. The principal barrier to such an understanding is Mihailowitch. Although it is frequently stated in rumors, there is no definite evidence which can be obtained of an accord between the Partisans and the Soviet Union.

"9. Generally stated, most of the Yugoslavs desire a democratic Government and a federated Yugoslavia, covering Slovene areas taken by Germany and Italy after the first World War. They are not definite on the means of accomplishing the former aim."

William J. Donovan
Director

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Ba/Baus - 12 292
x Political Situation
x Economic "
x Cairo Cable

25 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum for the
President which contains information he asked
me to obtain. Would you please see that he
receives it? Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Info - for -
112 77 - for Gustav Cairns 10/21/43

25 October 1943

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your wish, I have had made an evaluation of the causes for the deterioration of the Greek situation. I am assured by my people that the British in that area confirm this evaluation:

*1. Food: A famine of the proportions of the one of 1941-42 menaces Greece if she is not freed prior to the arrival of winter.

*2. King: There is no doubt that an overwhelming democratic sentiment exists among the Greeks, insisting that the King return prior to the holding of elections will only provoke incidents and consolidate the opposition.

*3. Dodecaness: Guarantees are wanted that the Greeks will get the Dodecanese Islands. The current British policy of keeping the Greeks out of participation in military operations and in future civil administration in the Dodecanese alienating both Dodecanese and Greek sentiment.

*4. The whole of Greece is united in a trend against the British due to the refusal by the Middle East Command to employ Greek troops in the Greek Islands.

*5. The Greeks are afraid that their national interests are placed in jeopardy by the establishment of Italy as a co-belligerent.

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All Greeks hate and deplore this arrangement. Based on several episodes that have taken place in the islands and in Greece itself, the Greeks keenly distrust the Italians as fighting allies.

"6. The communist-led EAM is the largest organization in Greece. Fighting is taking place between the Nationalist bands and the EAM during the current partial evacuation toward the north by the Nazis. It is claimed that the communist leaders of EAM with a view to taking over after Greece is freed are attempting to monopolize resistance organizations."

William J. Donovan
Director

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x 1916-1943

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 1683

A COMPARISON OF THE BALKAN SITUATION 1918 AND 1943

Description

A comparison of the military position in the Balkans of the Central Powers in 1918 and that of the Germans today, showing that the present German position appears stronger than that of 1918, but that Bulgarian morale, now as then, may prove a decisive factor in their defeat.

December 10, 1943

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

BA

SECRETSUMMARY

The 1918 position of the Central Powers in the Balkans, though apparently strong, was actually insecure, because of the German manpower shortage and Bulgarian war-weariness, brought to a head by Allied political warfare centered around the fourteen points. The breakthrough scored by the Allies, which led directly to the collapse of the Central Powers, can be attributed to these factors. The 1943 German position is dissimilar in most respects: the increased importance of airpower and of airdromes, and the absence of a land front, the greater number of troops at Germany's disposal, the difficulties created for the Germans by the large scale guerrilla opposition, and the network of modern fortifications in depth, all change the picture. Bulgarian morale, however, is still a vulnerable point, though today Bulgarian affection for Russia, anxiety to stay out of a shooting war, and fear of aerial bombardment, are the forces operating in favor of the Allies. A collapse might once more be induced by a well-managed campaign of psychological warfare.

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R & A #1683

26 Nov., 1943

A Comparison of the Balkan Situation in 1918 and in 1943.

1918: On the eve of the Allied Balkan offensive of 1918, which led directly to the collapse of the Central Powers in the West, 17 Bulgarian and 2 Turkish divisions, stiffened by a few German MG battalions and batteries, not totalling over one division, faced 31 Allied divisions on the Salonika front. The Adriatic flank was patrolled by the Austro-Hungarian Navy and important fortified coastal towns were held by relatively small Austro-Hungarian garrisons. There was no threat from Russia. Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, the only enemy territories, were effectively pacified, and there was no guerrilla opposition of any importance. At least 8 Bulgarian Divisions and some German units were located in the areas behind the front. Outside of second rate troops for occupation purposes in Russia and the Ukraine, the Central Powers had no military commitments, except in Italy and on the Western Front.

German control in the Balkans was exercised primarily through General Von Mackensen, Commander in Chief for the Balkans. Under him was a split command, with General Von Scholtz commanding the German units and the First Bulgarian Army, while the Second Bulgarian Army was under General Zhekov, Bulgarian Commander in Chief.

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The strategic position of the Central Powers appeared excellent. There was no serious threat of Allied landings on the Dalmatian coast, because of the lack at that time of modern amphibious air-supported landing techniques, and all forces could be concentrated on the Salonika Front, where natural defense lines tended to outbalance the Allied numerical superiority and slight preponderance in artillery. Air power had no great significance. The apparent security of this position was, however, deceptive. The position of the Germans with respect to combat manpower was in fact very tight. Replacements were not available to deal adequately with an emergency.

When the Allies launched an offensive on 2 September 1918, calculated to gain certain local tactical advantages, a complete breakthrough was achieved, and an armistice stipulating unconditional surrender of the Bulgarian armies was concluded on 29 September.

Bulgaria turned out to be the weakest link in the German defense system, partly because the Germans were unable to spare any reserves to restore the position. The Bulgarian collapse was not entirely due, however, to local military circumstances, but at least in part to the consternation in Bulgaria which

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followed the German defeats in France, and to general war weariness, brought to a head by Allied propaganda centered around Wilson's 14 points.

On the battlefield there was dissatisfaction with the German soldiers and the German Command. The Bulgarian officers did not relish the split command, nor the German methods of directing operations. The Bulgarian soldiers were alienated by German arrogance and the summary way in which the Germans requisitioned meager Bulgarian food supplies. Furthermore, the Allies had been dumping on the front lines large numbers of leaflets containing the 14 Points. These leaflets appeared to guarantee everything the Bulgars had been fighting for.

After weak resistance (from 2 until 15 September), the Bulgarian soldiers retreated, ceased to fight, and declared their intention of going home to gather in the harvest. They did not turn on the Germans. Morale, and not Allied superiority in personnel or equipment, was in large measure the cause of the Bulgarian collapse. The German and Bulgarian supply systems did not break down; neither did the generalship.

The morale conditions that affected the Bulgarian armies

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existed also on the home front. The Liberal Party Government which had played the game of Tsar Ferdinand and Berlin, and had maneuvered the country into war, was replaced in June, 1918 by a cabinet of Democrats and Agrarians headed by Alexander Malinov. Since both Democrats and Agrarians had opposed the pro-German policy of Ferdinand, this worried the Germans, and gave Allied diplomacy and propaganda opportunity to work on the Bulgarian people. The influence of the United States, which had never declared war on Bulgaria, and still maintained diplomatic representatives in Sofia, was exerted with skill.

Then, as today, the war was being fought in the name of Greater Bulgaria. The Communists and Agrarians formed the strongest opposition to the war policy of the government, and a number of bourgeois party leaders were willing to support them. The peasants were being exploited by the Germans, and many city-dwellers were getting rich on war profits.

The most serious morale factor was war-weariness. Bulgaria had been at war for six years, with brief interruptions; and the last three years had consisted largely of position war. This was very wearing on the Bulgarian soldier, who is deeply attached to the soil. Those outside influences on morale which are most important today were not significant then;

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namely, the attachment for Russia (then in the throes of revolution) and the fear of bombing.

* * * * *

1943: From a military point of view there is little obvious similarity between the situation in the Balkans in 1918 and today. Airpower, and the absence of a land front, have moved the center of activity from the Salonika area to a number of concentration points throughout the peninsula. The Adriatic flank is menaced by a possible seaborne invasion from Italy; mainland Greece and the islands are threatened from Africa; Turkey is a doubtful neutral; and Russia is within striking distance of Rumania and the Black Sea coast.

Whereas less than 30 divisions, mostly Bulgarian, were sufficient to occupy the Balkans and conduct offensive action against a large and well established Allied army in 1918, today Germany disposes of a total of over 65 divisions for operations in the Balkans. Of these some 20 to 25 are German and Austrian, 25 are Bulgarian, 10 Hungarian, and 5 Rumanian. (The last two countries have obligations on the Russian front which at present tie up another 15 or 20 divisions, but both are seeking to recall these troops.) Germany also has at her disposal small Croatian and Serbian forces. The distribution of the Axis forces is as follows: 7 German and 5 Bulgarian

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divisions in Greece; the equivalent of 13 German divisions and 7 Bulgarian divisions in Yugoslavia; 2 German divisions in Albania. Bulgaria has about 11 of her own divisions and the equivalent of at most 2 German divisions. Hungary has 7 divisions on the Serb and Croat frontiers. Rumania's divisions are held mostly in reserve against a Russian breakthrough or a landing on the Black Sea coast. The overall and much of the area command is under German generals. Except for Hungary, all armies are under split commands. Six or eight Rumanian and Hungarian divisions are temporarily immobilized, through mutual distrust, on the Transylvanian frontier.

There still remain at least 43 divisions devoted solely to the defense of the Balkan Peninsula against an Allied invasion. The military strength of these forces is an unknown quantity. The German and Austrian divisions are mostly such in name only. They are composed of as few as 20 or 30 percent Germans while the rest are Croats, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Dutch, and even White Russians and Cossacks. Smaller German units are chiefly technical or anti-aircraft personnel, either over or under aged. The Bulgarian divisions are well trained for Balkan fighting but they are not battle-tested. Little of the military equipment used by the Axis forces in the Balkans

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at present is of the highest quality. Bulgarian armaments, for instance, consist largely of captured Czech, Belgian, French, and Dutch equipment, old model planes, and rebuilt and out-dated tanks and guns.

The strategic position of the Axis today would at first glance appear weaker than that of the Central powers in 1918 because the Germans can not concentrate their forces on a short front, as at Salonika, without fear of being outflanked by a seaborne invasion. Moreover, the difficulties created by large-scale guerrilla warfare are formidable. These apparent weaknesses, however, seem to be more than counterbalanced by the elaborate network of modern fortifications in depth (on terrain highly advantageous to the defender) that have been built at all likely invasion points, by the network of large airdromes, and by temporary local aerial superiority. The first line of defense in almost every instance is occupied by German troops, with the satellite armies held in reserve, for use in covering any German retreat. The lines of communication from the central dispersal areas to any possible front are well prepared and guarded.

The German military situation in the Balkans must therefore on balance be said to be better than in 1918. The vulnerable point today, as in 1918, is morale, and particularly Bulgarian morale. A new element of German weakness consists in the

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fanatical support which the enslaved Yugoslav and Greek population will give the Allies in the event of a landing.

The morale situation in Bulgaria is important today because, though there are many more German troops in the Balkans in 1943 than there were in 1913, the largest and strongest unit is still the Bulgarian Army. Should Bulgaria collapse suddenly, or turn against Germany, Hitler's position in the Balkans might soon become untenable. There appears to be a good possibility of such a collapse. Though the morale factors involved are different from those in 1913, they are nevertheless just as powerful.

The most compelling influence in contemporary Bulgaria is the attachment to Russia. This attachment has historical and cultural roots, and is strengthened by Russia's military performance. The fact that Russia was allied to Germany in March 1941, was undoubtedly an important factor in the original Bulgarian decision to join the Axis. Bulgaria still maintains diplomatic relations with Russia and has refused to send troops to the Russian front. The communists in Bulgaria have so far been the only determined resistance group in the country, and have won the support of many other political groups, particularly among the peasants. Bulgarians hope that Russia will protect them against a severe peace treaty.

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A second morale factor is the desire of the people to keep their country out of the shooting war. This feeling was strong from the very beginning and appeared to be the basis of Bulgarian policy even before it became apparent that Germany would lose the war. The only way that Bulgaria has been kept faithful to the Axis has been by cloaking all Bulgarian military activity in support of Germany under the fiction that it constituted "defense of the legal frontiers of United Bulgaria."

A third morale factor, closely connected with the second, is the fear of aerial bombing which has gripped the urban population. This fear is converted to anger at the Germans whenever Bulgaria is bombed.

Operating against these factors, favorable to Allied psychological propaganda, is the fear existing in all classes that the Allies will allow Bulgaria to be partitioned, and that Greek or Yugoslavia troops will be used as occupation forces. Furthermore, German control over the Regency and the Government is such that defection from that quarter seems improbable. The morale of the army is relatively high, and it might fight well in a defensive war. The Bulgarian soldiers are not keen about their occupation duties and the old factors of German arrogance and the "split command" frictions are present.

It may reasonably be concluded that a diplomatic and

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psychological warfare campaign based on a study of all morale factors, coinciding with a Russian breakthrough toward Bessarabia or an Allied landing in force, might easily result in a collapse as complete as that of 1916.

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Top ↑

To: General Donovan
From: S. E. Gleason

The following notes prepared in the Current Intelligence Staff may be of use to you. No classified material was used in their preparation.

On

Card 11101416, the copies of the camera field

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ITALY

- First landing by US forces on continent of Europe
- 3rd - British 8th army supported by Allied naval and air units crosses straits of Messina to land at Reggio di Calabria.
Moves slowly up both coasts of the toe against weak opposition but impeded by extensive demolitions.
- 8th - Italy's unconditional surrender announced. Most of Italian fleet comes into Allied held ports in succeeding days.
- 9th - Allied forces of 5th Army land on coast of Gulf of Salerno; immediately engage Germans who offer strong opposition.
British troops supported by naval units land at Taranto. Move rapidly to complete conquest of the heel and its dozen airfields.
General Montgomery's 8th army pushes up from the south against increasing enemy rear-guard action and demolitions--slow, heavy progress.
Germans quickly reinforce their Salerno front, begin vigorous counterattacks of Allied beachhead aimed at splitting Allied forces in two by driving wedge straight through to sea. Seek to infiltrate the Allied beachhead anchor points at Salerno and Agropoli.
- 13- - Allied position at Salerno grows extremely grave.
- 14th - Salerno under heavy shell fire, port useless.
Heavy German pressure in center drives wedge into Allied position, advancing to within 4 miles of the sea, this advance finally checked with aid of guns from Allied warships off-shore, arrival of airborne Allied reinforcements and concentration of air intense aerial barrage in the battle area involving up to 2,000 sorties and 1,200 tons bombs dropped in 24 hour period.
- 16th - By 16th Allies were in a position to repulse successfully German counterattacks from all directions and to assume offensive which in general they have held ever since.
- 16th - General Montgomery's advance patrols achieve junction with British forces in Taranto Sector and General Clark's right flank at Salerno on the 17th.
Axis of the main Allied battle line which at Salerno had been running roughly north-south now gradually swings around to east-west direction, with Nocera, north of Salerno as pivot point.

- 2 -

By this time German air activity which had never been very great had become almost nil, while Allied air operations against vital communications increase in scope and effectiveness. Germans begin destruction at Naples.

21st Enemy retreating generally northward for next phase of major opposition north of Naples, but maintains strong resistance just north of Salerno.

27th -By now British and Canadian forces in the east had pushed up to Foggia which together with its 12 vital airdromes was occupied on 27th.

28th -Enemy resistance finally broken north of Salerno-- 5th Army enters Naples plain and by first of October had entered city of Naples. Since then slow progress generally all along front due to heavy rains, stiff German opposition demolitions. British amphibious operation at Termoli is successful despite vigorous enemy counter attacks. This is now familiar Allied strategy, repeated in effort to break German defense of Volturno River on 14th. Germans vigorously counterattacking Allied efforts to establish bridgeheads across Volturno--decisive Allied success not yet developed.

Outlook: Heavy and protracted German "rear-guard" resistance to Pisa-Rimini line where Germans expected to take up first of series of major stands. Germans are currently making a stand at the narrowest part of the whole peninsula. They will increasingly be hampered by Allied air blows to their communications and avenues of withdrawal, and the fact that for a while now the Allies at Foggia (and Naples) will have better airfields closer to the battlefronts than they, who must depend on fields in the Lombard plain. Weather will be a major Allied problem in air operations.

Interesting Point: Why did the Germans not commit maximum strength (available south of Rome) to try to liquidate completely the Allied bridgehead at Salerno? Answers, probably, (1) serious miscalculation (2) fear Salerno landing just a feint (3) decision to avoid a decisive struggle until Allies themselves had increased their own commitments.

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Sardinia and Corsica:

1. Of enormous strategic importance, in connection with any operations against coast of South France and in connection with Allied advance up Italian peninsula. Offer good base for amphibious operations, etc.

2. Fact that Germans gave up these islands so easily despite their great value to Allies.

3. Giraud's direction of French campaign in Corsica brings to a head crisis over delegation of power in FCNL; results in curbs on Giraud's own powers.

4. Germans occupy Elba.

Italy Political:

Germans seek to capitalize on this, increase confusion, and impair Italian aid to Allies by establishing Republican Fascist Government. This German move does not appear to have met with great success. Bulk of Italians are strongly anti-German, anti-Fascist and pro-Ally.

Allied and Italian efforts to rally opposition groups and Italian people behind the Royal Government appear to be meeting with success, especially in view of Badoglio's promises that base of his government will be broadened and assurances by both Badoglio and the Allies that Italy will have the right to choose her own form of democratic government when peace is restored.

The Italian declaration of war against Germany seems destined to have a good effect in rallying further Italian resistance to the Germans in the occupied zones as well as elsewhere.

Because he is the perfect picture of a deposed dictator it seems very doubtful that Mussolini can prove to be a valuable weapon in German hands.

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The Balkans:

The Italian surrender compelled the Germans to effect major redistributions of their occupational forces in order to replace the Italian occupational forces the bulk of which surrendered to the Germans without opposition.

Faced with the alternative of spreading their available forces thinly over such important strategic areas as the Dalmatian Coast, Yugoslavia and Albania or concentrating them in the defense of key cities, ports and communication lines, the Germans have selected the latter alternative, thus giving the native resistance groups a chance to increase the areas under their control. These resistance groups, however, are offering marked threats to vital German communications, especially the rail lines above the Istrian peninsula, between Ljubljana and Goritza.

Eastern Mediterranean:

British move into Kos, Leros, Samos around 20th September by-passing Crete, Sarpanto and Rhodes which the Germans had taken over from the Italians after some Italian resistance, especially on Crete. But British find it difficult to maintain hold on Kos and Leros in the face of greatly increased German air activity and heavy German air attacks on these islands. Germans without difficulty compel Italian garrisons on Corfu and Cephalonia in Adriatic to surrender.

U-Boat Warfare:

Allied position in Atlantic shipping lanes showed marked improvement through the summer, with number of U-boats sunk exceeding number of cargo ships torpedoed and sunk by the enemy. New enemy U-boat offensive in North Atlantic shipping lanes, in latter half of September does not appear to be developing to enemy's advantage.

Granting of Azores bases to the British for use in the anti-submarine campaign will be of

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considerable help by increasing markedly the Atlantic Ocean areas under Allied land based airplane patrol, affording continuous land-based airplane coverage for the vital Middle Atlantic shipping lanes (the shortest and most direct route from the US to the Mediterranean), permitting the use of this route rather than the stormy North Atlantic routes this winter, and freeing for operations elsewhere the auxiliary carriers which have been used to give air coverage to the "blind spots."

Far East:

Successful attacks of US naval and air units against island outposts protecting Japan on her eastern flank, such as the attack on Marcus Island, 18-19 September; and Wake, 5 October. Heavy damage also to enemy installations in air attacks on northern Gilberts and Nahr Island, 18-19 September.

No opposition from Japanese surface craft during September. Light engagement with forces evacuating Kolombangara.

In New Guinea, the capture of Lae, Salamaua and Finschafen, a strong new Allied offensive. Heavy air attacks on Wewak.

In the Solomons area, last Japanese resistance ends at Vella Lavella and Japanese evacuate Kolombangara island. US gains St. Isabel Island by default.

Very heavy and successful raid on Rabaul 12 October.

In China the 14th Airforce has been carrying out successful attacks against Haifong.

Paramishiru area in Japanese homeland bombed on 12 September.

Lord Mountbatten has arrived in India to take over the Southeast Asia command. Conferences between Mountbatten, Wavell, Somervell etc.

A crisis in relations between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communists was successfully passed and the threat of civil war was averted.

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Russia:

The continuing Russian offensive has succeeded in ousting the Germans from the Caucasus and pushing them back to the line of the Dnieper throughout its Middle reaches. The Germans show a strong disposition to hold the Crimea and the mainland area immediately to the north. The German withdrawal has been deliberate and orderly, potentially dangerous encirclements have been avoided, and relatively few German prisoners have been taken by the Russians.

A Russian winter drive in the North towards the Baltic is seen as likely.

Significant political developments have included the formation of the Free German Committee in Moscow and the German Officers Union, the latter headed by important German Junker officers of high rank, a return to traditional titles and systems in the army, diplomatic corps government workers, etc.; the forthcoming tripartite conference in Moscow.

Air Offensive:

Increasing striking power and effectiveness of 8th Air Force in daylight raids against vital targets in Germany and German occupied countries. Increased tempo and weight of Allied air attacks on German targets, plus increased scope of these operations to include key south German industrial targets like Regensburg and Wiener Neustadt, thus counteracting German efforts to move important plants, especially fighter aircraft plants, to less vulnerable areas. As the Allies advance up the Italian peninsula and acquire new airdromes closer to Germany they gain the opportunity for successful attacks against all German industrial targets as well as such vital sources of German raw materials as the Rumanian oil fields.

The installation of Himmler as Security Chief for Germany and Speer as economic chief represents a general tightening of control on the home front to try to deal effectively with the increasing stresses and strains that are being placed upon the German residents of the Festung Europa by Allied actions.

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There is no doubt that the majority of the Germans are not Nazis today. Apathy, weariness and distrust is outstanding among the masses. One cannot, however, say that any great proportion of the German people are anti-Nazi. Most of them appear to realize that the war is lost to Germany. But bad morale will not impair the fighting and productive efficiency of Germany so long as the organizational framework is intact. The Himmler, Speer appointments were made to strengthen that organizational framework. (For a full discussion see the JIC Weekly Summary, 22 September, p. 18)

The fact that Germany has now been forced to discontinue treatment of Denmark as a model state and accord her the role of just another occupied country highlights the problems which Germany increasingly must face in the occupied countries. As well there have been new indications of diminishing zest for Axis membership in such satellite countries as Hungary. Italy's example undoubtedly has encouraged ideas in the minds of other satellite governments which cannot be pleasing to the Germans and which dictate strenuous German diplomatic efforts to prevent further withdrawals from the Axis fold.

Belmont 10, 2, 54
X. Information 10, 2, 1943
** Good irregular project*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: October 25, 1943

TO: General W. J. Donovan
 FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson
 SUBJECT: Col. Amoss' memo (undated) received October 21,
 1943, subject "Special Intelligence Project".

1. I have read the above memorandum with considerable interest.
2. I recommend (at your request) that Macfarland be instructed by Col. Amoss how to build on the "fragment of the old G - Irregular Project" with which he is in touch.
3. There seems to me no reason why the project should be "special", or handled in any way different from the way London handles its foreign sources, or different from the way in which our Mission in Spain deals with elements there.
4. I am most anxious that the project cease to be irregular, or special, and that the sources (probably of real value) be treated like other sources of value.

Whitney H. Shepardson
 Whitney H. Shepardson

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SECRETSPECIAL INTELLIGENCE PROJECT

Balkan 12,854
X Intelligence Project
X Greek Irregular Project

Contention is made that Balkan intelligence presently flows from controlled sources; that original intelligence is scant.

It is further contended that no independent source of Balkan information exists. (Exception: Macfarland, through a fragment of the old Greek Irregular Project plus several new sources, does receive some valuable intelligence which he channels through Cairo.)

It is submitted that a completely secret system under the direct orders of the Director or his Deputy is required for these purposes:

1. Check on authenticity of intelligence presently received from friendly foreign sources.
2. Maintain an independent reporting system.
3. Have a highly mobile organization ready at once to secure intelligence which, in emergency, may be required by the President, the Chiefs of Staff, or by ranking cabinet officers.

Such a system exists. It has performed and has been proven. A part of the system has been "blown". A major part is completely unknown either to our allies or even to OSS

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officers except the Director and his immediate lieutenants.

This system provided OSS with its first original intelligence from behind enemy lines and at a time when absence of a directive apparently "froze" operations. This system had contacts in Greece, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. All these points reported from time to time and these reports were disseminated through regular OSS sources without disclosure of their irregular source.

Types of intelligence reported were: Aerial target information; Morale of civilians and troops in Central Europe and in occupied countries; Political moves in Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

This system suffered the first OSS casualties when four of its agents were executed in Athens.

Though it is unknown to our British allies, it was by activities of agents of this system that the British caique-ferry service between Greece and Turkey was established, manned and operated -- and, until March 1943, controlled. (Captain Zangas, R.H.N. and his staff.) This caique service, operated at virtually no cost to the United States was then taken over by combined British agencies.

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Russian intelligence was reported by this system through regular OSS channels.

Through this system, the Chief of the German intelligence system was contacted and (inadvertently) the British P.W.E. was enabled to frame him before Hitler.

Through this system Greek morale has been held high despite famine and pestilence by the uninterrupted preachings of its agents that the might of America was gathering and soon would be felt.

Through this system, the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East received information that led him to bomb airfields in Saloniki and Athens for the dual purpose of inflicting military damage and raising Greek morale.

Through this system the Greek Brigades were penetrated at the request of the American Commanding General who received resulting intelligence as an emergency service of OSS. (These reports were also filed with OSS, Washington.)

Through agents of this system, OSS was able to stop a revolution, prevent further bloodshed between our allies (Greek and British) and to stop the damaging German propaganda line in Greece.

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Through this system, the United States Anti-Submarine command received valuable intelligence.

The volume of intelligence was great. Dissemination was through regular OSS sources -- without exception.

It is submitted that this system should be preserved; its confidences protected; its operations executed in super-secrecy.

This system taps -- and can control -- five separate and completely independent chains of agents. This system has its own trained agents in the Balkan States waiting instructions.

There is only one OSS official presently in the Middle East even remotely capable of directing these activities and only one equipped by experience to assist him. And the writer is the only person able to turn over these activities.

Recommendation is made that the writer turn over to Mr. Lanning Macfarland as much of these operations as can be given him with the consent of the key aides.

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Balkans 12,538

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ESTIMATE OF THE PROBABLE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF ITALY

Statement of the Problem

1. To state the present situation in the Balkans and to estimate the probable consequences of the collapse of Italy.

Discussion

2. Definition of "the Balkans". For the purposes of this paper the Balkans include Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and the Dodecanese Islands.

3. Existing political control. All of the Balkan governments except Turkey are at present under Axis control, direct or indirect. In Yugoslavia (Serbia and Croatia), Greece and Albania puppet governments are completely under the orders of German or Italian military authorities. In Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria the governments in office are composed of Nazi collaborators, dominated by Nazi advisers or diplomatic representatives. In Turkey the government is free of effective foreign control but is in alliance with Britain and on exceedingly friendly terms with the United States. In Yugoslavia and Greece the effectiveness of control by existing governments is very much restricted by anti-governmental guerilla forces operating in many localities.

4. Existing military control. In Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania the effective military forces are German or Italian, with a small Croat force officered by Germans. In Hungary and Rumania the national armies are to a large extent mobilized but have suffered very heavy losses in Russia, where small contingents are still operating. The Bulgarian army is intact and concentrated in Bulgarian territory or contiguous areas.

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In Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria airfields, transportation facilities and important industrial establishments are guarded by special German forces. The Turkish army is mobilized and considerable forces are in Eastern Thrace and along the Aegean coasts. All of the Balkan armies are believed to lack adequate modern equipment such as airplanes, anti-aircraft artillery, and tanks as well as personnel competent to handle equipment of a complicated nature.

5. Axis forces in the Balkans. German forces in the Balkans are variously estimated at the equivalent of 18 to 19½ divisions. The majority of these forces are believed to be in Crete, Southern Greece (the Morea), the Salonika area and Serbia, with small and isolated detachments in Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and Rumania guarding points of special military importance. Italian forces are estimated at 31 divisions, stationed in the Dodecanese, Samos, Greece, Albania and the Adriatic coast and immediate hinterland. The morale of Italian troops is known to be very low.

6. Strength of Balkan armies. The Hungarian army consists of 31 divisions, the Rumanian of 27, the Bulgarian of 20 and the Turkish of approximately 40. As noted above, these armies are all deficient in modern mechanical equipment and consequently of doubtful value for offensive operations against a well trained and well equipped enemy. Only in Croatia is there a Balkan force officered by Germans.

7. Basis of collaboration with Axis. In Hungary and Bulgaria the governments are collaborating because this policy originally seemed to offer the prospect of territorial gains in line with long-standing revisionist aims. Fear of German attack and belief in the inevitability of German dominance at least economic, perhaps also political, were

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decisive factors. Fear of aggressive communism played a considerable part at first and has steadily become more important as the military strength of Russia has been understood. In Rumania Axis collaboration was undertaken without hope of gain and merely because it seemed inescapable and offered the only hope of continued existence as a nation. In Croatia collaboration was the outgrowth of bitter resentment against Serbian ^{domination} ~~administration~~ of the Yugoslav government. In no case was collaboration the result of belief in a long-range community of interests and in all cases even ardent collaborationists are suspicious of ultimate German intentions regarding their countries.

7. Importance of "official class" mentality in the Balkans. In all of the countries under consideration there are two principal social classes which monopolize political and military life -- peasants and officials, the latter including military officers. Other classes, large land-owning, commercial and professional, are either closely identified with the officials or belong to religio-political minorities with negligible political and military power. Industrial laborers are few in number and in general closely tied by family and tradition to the peasant class, whence they have very recently come. The official class in each country operate the machinery of government for their own benefit in terms of position, wealth, power and social prestige. Their official incomes are very often supplemented unofficially. They manipulate for their own advantage whatever popular or democratic forms of government may exist. In short, the system is really the disguised dictatorship of a class, which is not numerous in proportion to the total population and is closely tied in with whatever large landholding and industrial enterprise there

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may be. In several of these countries the only significant industrial developments are in the hands of state-financed banks and thus really a part of the government monopoly. The fundamental aim of the ruling classes is to maintain and if possible expand the area and depth of their exploitation of their countries and peoples. In time of external danger they confine their attention to maintenance, but they are always ready for expansion whenever this seems feasible and lacking in danger.

8. Balkan Sympathy with Russia. In the Slavic countries admiration and sympathy for Russia are widespread and traditional, having originated during the period of Tsarist Pan-Slav propaganda. Only in Bulgaria is there much communist sentiment among the peasants. The ruling classes of course differentiate much more clearly than do peasants between what is Russian and what is communist. In Yugoslavia the Partisan guerillas are strongly under Soviet influence. Small but well organized Communist parties are in existence. In Hungary and Rumania there is no vital tradition of sympathy with Russia, but communist organizations are believed to be widespread. In Turkey there is no significant communist group and to all classes Russia, whether Tsarist or Soviet, is the dreaded traditional enemy. Opinion regarding Russia in Greece is less sympathetic than in the Slavic countries but not so fearful as in Turkey, while communist influence is very strong among guerillas and underground organizations.

9. Balkan reactions to Russian victories. Reactions to the earlier victories were highly favorable except in "collaborationist" circles, for they offered the prospect of relief from Axis pressure. The hope then arose of a battle to exhaustion between the gigantic Soviet and Nazi

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armies, with consequent increase in freedom of action to small states. But now the more intelligent and far sighted individuals, if not whole governments, realize that in all probability the war will be lost by the Germans, and won, at least in Eastern Europe, by the Russians. Members of the ruling classes of all the Balkan countries are asking themselves what will be their fate in the event of a Russian victory. They know that the white-collar classes have been dispossessed and decimated in countries occupied by Soviet forces, they are familiar with traditional Russian imperialistic thinking about Southeastern Europe and they are not entirely unaware that the peasants of their own countries have reason to be unenthusiastic toward existing regimes and their pre-war prototypes. They are becoming convinced that the Axis powers can no longer be counted on to protect them against Soviet pressure. They are thoroughly alarmed and are now thinking primarily in terms of existence rather than of expansion. They are already badly shaken and soon will be in such abject terror that they may agree to practically any proposal which the Anglo-Americans may make. Before their terror becomes obvious to us, they would like to obtain from us binding and convincing guarantees of protection against Russia.

10. Balkan reactions to Italian defeats and the fall of Mussolini.

These developments have intensified tremendously the opinion that the Axis is doomed and have made it imperative that immediate measures be taken to adjust plans and policies. Especially since the 1940 Italian campaign against Greece, Fascist military prestige has been at a low ebb. Italy is now regarded as a negligible factor in political and military calculations, which are based solely on estimates of military power,

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for it is believed that the large Italian armies in the Balkan area will disintegrate quickly and lose all fighting value.

11. Effect of Italian collapse on attitude toward Germany. That Italian collapse is resulting in great embarrassment to Germany and to an increase in military responsibility without increase in strength to the Wehrmacht is fully realized. However, fear of German power and respect for the force, skill and thoroughness of the German military are universal and may for some time continue. If signs of weakening in German military morale appear, this fear and respect can be expected to evaporate quickly. Very acute observers are watching closely for symptoms of this kind and all the Balkan peoples are capable of perpetrating massacres of German troops.

Conclusions

12. Political. The thinking of the ruling classes in all Balkan countries has up to the present been dominated by fear of Germany, but this fear is now declining rapidly in the face of a growing fear of Soviet power and intentions. In hope of securing support against possible Russian designs the Balkan ruling classes are looking to Britain and the United States. The situation is believed to be ripe for negotiation with political "outs" who would probably accept almost any terms of surrender that might be proposed. The Turks may also be induced to move against the Germans, or at least to allow use of their territory, if promised a hand in the post-war settlement.

13. Military. The coherent and fairly well armed forces of Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary are capable of being used against the Germans in the Balkan area, and would be available if political

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arrangements for these countries to secede from the Axis can be made. Guerillas in Greece and Yugoslavia would also be available to us if the previous agreement of the U.S.S.R. is obtained. The Turkish army is also available but it is believed that the price of its co-operation would be high in terms of political commitments, so a less expensive deal permitting Allied use of Turkish airfields, bases and waterways is regarded as more desirable. If the secession of Balkan collaborationist states from the Axis can be brought about, the armies available to them are believed to be adequate to deal with German forces now in the Balkan area.

Prepared for Quebec Conference by Dr. Robinson

x Summary Wayne
x R & A.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF BALKAN OPERATIONS

March 29, 1943

SECRET
March 28, 1943

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF BALKAN OPERATIONS

Until the Axis position in Tunisia is liquidated Balkan operations must of necessity be limited to guerrilla activities supported only by such supplies and personnel as can be ferried by air from North Africa. Even after Tunisia has been taken the use of the Mediterranean will require the neutralization of Sicily. In the following discussion it is assumed that both these tasks have been accomplished.

I. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS

After Tunisia has been conquered, two sets of operations in the Balkans deserve consideration:

(a) An operation on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Such an operation would be limited to the supplying of guerrilla troops through the eastern Adriatic ports. Limitation of port facilities and the inadequacy of routes inland from the sea throughout the whole area south of Fiume makes it impractical to attempt large scale landing operations. On the other hand, the provisioning of guerrilla forces in the Balkans can best be undertaken through the Adriatic ports. The tonnages required are small and would not exceed the capacities of the ports which might be made available. The supply of a force of 300,000 guerrillas with ammunition of smaller calibre than 105 mm. together with small arms would require the continuous services of only 4 or 5 ships. Certain of the routes inland from the ports lead to territory which is or can be temporarily controlled by guerrilla forces. The character of the operations envisaged would necessitate, at a minimum, the seizure and control of any one of a number of small ports for such period of time as would permit the unloading of

striking at one port and then another, coordinated with guerrilla attacks on the ports in question from the interior. Air cover for ships en route to and from destination and in port would require the conquest of air bases on either or both sides of the Strait of Otranto. If such air cover could be provided, it is possible that the strength of guerrilla forces might be sufficient to permit the holding and continuous use of one or more of the Adriatic ports.

The principal advantage of such an operation would be the facilitating of guerrilla attacks on Axis supply lines to the south Balkans. Such attacks, if persistent and effective, might force Axis withdrawal from southern Greece.

(b) An operation involving the establishment of a sizeable United Nations bridgehead in the Balkans with a well protected supply line. An examination of existing and potential port facilities in the area forces the conclusion that Salonica offers the most feasible, if not the only base of operations. Although the terrain of Bulgaria and Rumania affords easier land transport, port facilities of the principal Black Sea ports are small. Burgas and Varna have a daily capacity of 2,200 and 3,000 metric tons respectively, compared with a daily capacity of 7,000 metric tons at Salonica. Port facilities at Constanta are larger (7,200 tons), but the establishment of a major bridgehead at this point would involve, in addition to passing through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, a considerable sea route through the Black Sea vulnerable to land based aircraft. The creation of a bridgehead at Salonica obviously would involve a major air, sea and ground attack. As noted above, the

securing of - E. Mediterranean requires the neutralization of Axis air power based on Sicily. A protected supply line through the Aegean would require either continuous air cover or the elimination of Axis air power based on Crete, southern Greece and the Aegean Islands.

As long as it stands Crete offers an apparently insurmountable obstacle to an entrance to the Aegean from Africa. While the conquest of Crete from North Africa is not altogether out of the question the provision of continuous and extensive fighter cover over landing operations from bases 230-250 miles away would be a very difficult task. The use of Turkish territory, if not outright participation of Turkey on our side, would not only facilitate the elimination of Axis forces from Crete and the Aegean Islands -- essentially an air operation -- but is almost a prerequisite for success. In the following discussion of operation (b) it is, therefore, assumed that, at a minimum, Turkey will participate to the extent of permitting United Nations air bases on her territory. Since Turkey possesses only three large developed bases confronting the Aegean -- together with numerous small ones -- the first task facing a United Nations expedition in the Balkans must be the protection of existing and the development of a large number of new Turkish bases.

II. DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF OPERATION B

(a) Objectives. The principal objectives of operation (b) are: (1) diversion of maximum Axis forces -- in particular, air forces -- away from other theatres; (2) encouragement of increased guerrilla warfare against Axis supply lines, personnel and equipment; (3) denial to

the Axis of copper, chrome, oil and other resources.
(4) establishment of a base of operations on the continent.

The extent of the diversion of Axis forces will depend upon commitments in other theatres, the capacity of supply routes to the Balkans, and the strength of the United Nations invasion.

Assuming that guerrilla forces can be supplied through the Adriatic ports, the size and effectiveness of these forces and the importance of their objectives will be much increased by an Allied landing in the Balkans.

The importance of the Balkans as a source of raw materials is shown by the fact that about one-third of the Axis oil supply comes from Rumania, one-third of Axis copper from Yugoslavia, and about 75% of Axis chromium from Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. This chromium, together with Turkish supplies constitutes more than 99% of the Axis supply. Yugoslavia provides 24% of Axis lead, 20% of antimony, 10% of bauxite, and 6% of zinc consumption. Disruption of communication or capture of these areas would thus deprive the Axis of an important source of essential minerals. The loss of Rumanian oil would have a critical effect on Axis industrial and military activity.

(b) Axis strength in the Balkans. At present, the ground forces in the area are largely Italian. Germany has 8 divisions in Yugoslavia (of which two are reserve training divisions) and 2 divisions in Greece. Italy has 17 infantry divisions, 2 mountain divisions, and 1 mobile division in Yugoslavia, 4 divisions in Albania, 8 in Greece, 1 in Crete, and 2 in Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands. In the Aegean islands, there is one infantry division and one mobile equivalent. Rumania has 8 divisions (including one

1 mobile and 1 armored unit). In addition, there are 3 Bulgarian divisions in Greece.

In the event of a United Nations operation in the Balkans, it is possible and perhaps probable, in view of the vulnerability of Italy to attack, that Italian ground forces would not be augmented and might possibly be decreased. The extent of German reinforcement would depend primarily on the magnitude of commitments in other theatres. The conditions under which satellite troops, including Bulgarian, would oppose the United Nations forces are discussed below.

Axis and satellite air dispositions in the Mediterranean are estimated as follows:

GERMAN

	<u>Crete-Greece</u>	<u>Sicily-Sardinia</u>	<u>Tunisia</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fighters	0	264	180	444
Bombers	24	696	84	804
Others	12	12	12	36
Total	36	972	276	1284

ITALIAN

	<u>Dodecanese</u>	<u>Yugo-Greece</u>	<u>Sicily & Pantellaria</u>	<u>Sardinia</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Tunis</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fighters	40	40	135	60	275	70	620
Bombers	40	25	80	100	100	0	345
Others	15	85	60	60	75	0	305
Total	95	160	275	220	450	70	1270

SATELLITE

	<u>Bulgaria</u>	<u>Rumania</u>	<u>Hungary</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fighters	146	110	100	356
Bombers	90	92	66	256
Others	106	152	140	402
Total	350	354	306	1014

must be assumed Axis aircraft would be concentrated in Greece, Crete and the Aegean Islands to the limit of existing air fields and supply routes.

The strength and disposition of Axis naval forces in the Mediterranean is as follows: In the Mediterranean, Italy has 6 (perhaps 8) battleships, 10 cruisers, 71 destroyers, and 59 submarines, while Germany has 25 submarines. In addition, there are 6 German submarines in the Black Sea.

It is problematical whether United Nations operations would be exposed to naval attack other than submarine. The vulnerability of Italy plus the unwillingness of the Italian navy to give battle might lead to the withholding of other naval forces.

(c) Air aspects. The establishment of a United Nations base in the Balkans is essentially an air operation. What is required is the conquest of Crete and a number of the Aegean Islands with a subsequent development and use of air bases on those islands for the protection of Allied shipping and for attack on Axis positions on the mainland. At every stage in the process United Nations forces would be moving within range of land-based enemy fighters. Since the Axis would undoubtedly defend its position at every step the Balkan operation would yield an excellent opportunity to whittle down Axis fighter strength, providing United Nations planes were not forced to fight under too unfavorable conditions. A reduction of Axis air strength must be considered to be one of the most

important objectives of the operation. It can be seen that what is involved is, at a minimum, an air operation of great proportions.

There are 5 Axis airfields on Crete, of which 3 are important, 5 in the Dodecanese, 2 on the Aegean islands north of Crete and 18-20 on the eastern side of the Greek mainland, of which at least a dozen are large capacity fields. No ship movement through the Aegean could be attempted without control of the island air fields and at least a partial neutralization of those in eastern Greece.

(d) Attitude of the Soviet Union. During the course of the war, it has become increasingly clear that the Soviet Union regards the Balkans as its legitimate sphere of influence. Pan-Slavic sentiment is still strong in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and Russia has enhanced her prestige through the successful resistance to Germany. So strong is Russian prestige and influence among Yugoslavs and Bulgarians that, if Russia should not express in advance her satisfaction with an Anglo-American Balkan operation, an invasion by our Armed Forces would receive less support and meet more resistance. Conversely, Russian sanction of an Anglo-America operation would place at our disposal all anti-German forces in these two countries.

It follows that an agreement with the Soviet Union would be desirable in advance of the undertaking. Whatever her ultimate intention with respect to southeastern Europe, Russia's immediate objective is clearly the defeat of Germany. If the United States and Great Britain insist

that their commitments on the European continent can best be made in the Balkans, it seems likely that the Soviet Union would lend to the undertaking the moral support necessary to win the participation of the important local pro-Russian groups.

(c) Local forces. In the event of a successful United Nations landing, the available local forces, as noted above, are estimated at 300,000 to 400,000. It is improbable that a large number could slip through the line to join United Nations forces. Consequently, most of their effort would take the form of behind-the-lines guerrilla activities. The magnitude of this effort would depend on (a) how adequately guerrilla forces could be equipped, and (b), particularly in the case of Bulgarians and Yugoslavs, the attitude of Russia toward United Nations operations in the Balkans.

(1) Bulgaria. Bulgaria has made and will continue to make, every effort to keep out of the war. However, if Bulgarian territory is invaded, her forces may oppose United Nations operations. Such opposition may possibly be avoided if:

- (a) Adequate diplomatic measures are taken to guarantee Bulgaria's position after the war, and,
- (b) Leaders become convinced that the Axis must lose.

[illegible]

The active participation of Bulgarian guerrillas on the side of the United Nations will depend primarily on the attitude of Russia toward these operations.

- (2) Yugoslavia. The guerrilla forces under Mihailovich will be available in any case, their effectiveness depending on the adequacy with which they are equipped. These forces, however, have been declining in numbers. The availability of other guerrilla forces will depend largely on the attitude of Russia toward the operation. Probably 100,000 troops, poorly equipped, could be relied upon for assistance at the time of invasion. If operations are successful, and the support of the "opposition" group in the Partisan army is obtainable, this number may be augmented to 200,000 or 300,000. Virtually all equipment must be supplied, however.

- (3) Greece and Albania. At the time of the German invasion, Greece had about 250,000 men under arms. Of this number, it is estimated that about 150,000 would be available in the event of a United Nations campaign. Together with reserves of military age, the total might be as high as 450,000.

equipment, except, perhaps, for some rifles concealed by the evacuating armies in 1941.

In Albania, the maximum number of fighting men is estimated at 200,000. Again, very little equipment is available, since the Albanians were disarmed by the Italians.

(f) The position of Turkey. It has already been indicated that any attempt to establish a permanent bridgehead in the Balkans is excessively difficult without some measure of Turkish cooperation. Turkey would certainly not consent to the use of her territory for United Nations air operations unless and until she is convinced that the Axis is losing the war and until it has been convincingly demonstrated that the United Nations are capable of defending Turkish territory against any retaliation which the use of her air bases might provoke. Such a demonstration would presumably have to take the form of completely adequate preparations for major operations.

However, if Turkey is convinced (a) that the Axis is well along toward losing the war and (b) that United Nations preparations for a Balkan campaign give promise of success, it is possible that her desire for a favorable position at the Peace Conference and for British and American support against potential Russian claims may be sufficient to induce a limited measure of participation.

(g) The shipping situation. Movement of 100,000 men with supplies, from the U.S. into the Balkans would require about 50 transports of 13,000 gross registered tons each, about 50 cargo ships of 6,700 g.r.t. each, and 2 tankers of 10,000 g.r.t. each.

supplied, the services of 30 cargo ships of 6,700 g.r.t. and 5 tankers of 10,000 g.r.t. would be needed. These figures assume complete control of the Mediterranean. With incomplete control, about 20% additional shipping would be required.

The supply of 800,000 guerrillas with ammunition would require the continuous service of only 3 or 4 ships. If the same force were to be supplied with all materials, except solid fuels, engineering and construction materials, and air corps supplies, at 50% of the American rate of consumption, 16 cargo ships would be required.


(h) Terrain. The mountainous character of most of the Balkan region makes military operations difficult. The obstacles to troop movements are less forbidding in the northern and eastern sections (Rumania, Bulgaria, and Thrace) than in the south and west (Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania). The easiest routes -- those leading inland from the Black Sea -- would require Turkish cooperation if not active collaboration.

A more direct route lies through the Vardar and Morava Valley of Greece, from Salonica to Belgrade. An alternative route to Belgrade from Salonica is provided by the Struma Valley.

Supply of an army of 100,000 would require about 1,100 long tons per day. Since the port facilities at Salonica are capable of handling 7,000 metric tons per day, no shortage of port facilities should develop on the Salonica-Belgrade routes.

The Vardar-Morava rail line, although single-tracked, should provide a good means of inland supply, if air support is sufficient to prevent bombing of its numerous bridges.

PROVISIONAL EDITION



BALKAN REGION Schematic Map

PRINCIPAL TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

Railroads
 ——— Narrow Gauge ——— Standard Gauge
 Roads
 • Airfields

ESTIMATED PORT CAPACITIES



PIRAEUS
(7,500)

Daily Capacity in Metric
Tons-General Cargo



Novi Grad
(a)

Capacity Unknown. Probably Less
Than 500 Metric Tons

TERRAIN



Plains-Tablelands



Hill Lands




Mountains

0 50 100 150 200
MILES


M E D I T

MAP NO. 2243
15 MARCH 1963


SECRET



COMPILED AND DRAWN IN THE BRANCH OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, OSS
REPRODUCED IN THE REPRODUCTION SECTION, OSS









COMPILED AND DRAWN BY THE BRANCH OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, OS
 REPRODUCED IN THE REPRODUCTION SECTION, OS

YUGOSLAVIA

Flaming Slav passions make the Yugoslav mess almost insoluble. General "Tito" and General Mihailovitch are irreconcilable. The Serb considers the Croat and Slovene past traitors and future dangers to a South Slav State. The Croat and the Slovene, discontents for a thousand years, bitter critics of their Government for the last twenty, are no nearer reconciliation now.

Into the dispute is introduced the Communist agitator who terms the Serb a Fascist; who claims that Mihailovitch plots a totalitarian state of old Serbia and Bulgaria with himself first as authoritarian president of council; later as king.

The Government-in-Exile, target of Communist and of Croat, is composed of mediocracies; is ruled by Dowager Queen Marie (Rumanian Marie's daughter by a Rumanian cavalry captain). Marie, stoutish, plain and ordinarily affable is still run by the Knejevitch brothers, the opportunist young men who, at one time, introduced the boy king to rather unattractive older prostitutes and to dope.

Older military men have been scuttled by the ambitious Knejevitch clan, leaving only unimportant officers and bewildered younger men and a scattering of others such as Lieutenant-Colonel Radoychich, now aide to the King and Colonel Savlitch who, the Queen told me, is "loyal, but wacky; victim of numerous crack-ups in the air and on the ground and of numerous bumps on the head."

-2-

Potitch, Ambassador to the United States, is the cleverest of all Yugoslav statesmen, but his character is under gravest assault and his blood relationship to Yugoslav quislings adds fuel to the flames of criticism.

The most brilliant; perhaps the most serious of Serbs in exile is Colonel Popovitch, the trusted confidant of General Bonner Fellers; a man I have found honest, able and informed--perhaps the best of all intelligence operators in Eastern Europe. But, the Knejevitch brothers consider him a personal danger and Lord Glenconner lost no opportunity to isolate him.

More serious - from one point of view - than the above is the attitude and activity of British S.O.E. toward the Yugoslav mess. It is the opinion of many skilled observers that S.O.E. meddling and their misinforming of other British departments is largely responsible for the present chaotic condition of affairs in Yugoslavia. Up to my departure from the Middle East it is highly doubtful if S.O.E.'s Colonel Bailey had seen or contacted Mihailovitch for more than half a year; it is suspected that Mihailovitch's radio messages were forgeries.

Adding suspicion to doubt was the severe attempt on the part of S.O.E. to prevent O.S.S. direct and independent intelligence contact with Mihailovitch; their determination to block any American direct reporting of conditions in the Mihailovitch "area."

While I was on duty in the Middle East, I attempted to send two reporters who believed they could use their own means in making contact with the Mihailovitch Headquarters. One man

-3-


is presumed lost; the other, after a rugged and dangerous trip from Turkey, through Thrace and Macedonia, was turned back at the Montenegrin frontier and eventually made his way through Greece proper across the Aegean to Turkey, finally arriving in Cairo. This agent met Mihailovitch's men who reported that their forces were on the run, seeking shelter; never able to stay long enough at one spot to establish headquarters. They claimed that Partisan sympathizers were reporting their movements to occupation troops. Asked if any British officers were attached to Mihailovitch's staff, they said there were none. The agent said the trip was dangerous; he would not repeat it because of his fears of being turned in by Partisan sympathizers or even by Chetniks.

It is doubted if we have the present means of giving original, factual and correct intelligence concerning conditions inside of Yugoslavia even though we now have men there.

U. L. A.

M. O'Donnell

Director: _____



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Balkans 10.12
1 Russia
1 Discussion
X McCloy 1/1/43

January 27, 1943

The Hon. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
3E961 Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jack:

I have your note attaching memorandum concerning Moses Fainberg. We would be interested in talking with him and I will see that this is done.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Top ↑

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

January 24, 1943

MEMO FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Would you be interested
in the attached?

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J. J. MCC.

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
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Balkans 10.1.31
x Russia
x Discussion
x McCloy JJ


January 21, 1943

MEMORANDUM To Assistant Secretary McCloy

The attached memorandum was sent to me by an American citizen of Russian birth who is unusually well-informed about Russian affairs. It raises questions far above my level. If the suggestions have merit action would be indicated by O.M.I., O.S.S. and possibly Governor Lehman's staff as well as the State Department.


Edward S. Greenbaum
Colonel, Ord. Dept.
Executive Officer

Encl.



Balkans 10,131
x Russia
x Discussion
x McClellan - J.S.

Since I wrote you in Dec. on the Russian-Balkan angle, cables from Ankara and London confirm my expectations of a strong revolutionary movement spreading in Bulgaria and Rumania.

One can postulate three possible developments, all predicated on big Russian successes in the near future:

1. Prediction by Ambassador Joseph E. Davis (Times, Jan. 14): "If the Soviets can obtain through Murmansk and Persia sufficient (help) they might smash through the German lines through Rumania and the Balkans. At the end of 1943 I expect to see the Germans still fighting with shrunken lines"

2. I doubt possibility of Davis's prediction. Perhaps he relies on pre-Munich Russian military plans which were predicated upon intact Ukraine and her industries and communication system, possession of Bessarabia and existence of Czechoslovakia. Also papers report Germany fortifying Poland, and Rumanian and Balkan possible points of military attacks.

2. Perhaps my wishful thinking: A peasant revolution in all the Balkans coinciding with the Hitler Army being still in Russia; desertion of the Rumanian Army to the Russian side; inability to cope with a peasant-guerilla war (reinforced by Moscow organized local leadership) by tanks, dive-bombers or cancellation of bread cards; collapse of food and oil deliveries and of the communication system in general; and as a result a complete rout and loss of the whole German Army in the Hungarian-Balkan-Russian tangle, surpassing the rout of Napoleon, on the basis of similar geographical cases.

Russia has done much to allay the little Balkan states' fear of cooperating with Russia and to permit the old ties of Russian-Turkish wars of Liberation of the Balkans to reassert themselves:

(a) The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Constitutions (after their joining the USSR in July, 1940) guarantee small peasant land ownership (to 75 acres - a lot in that part of Europe) against nationalization or collectivization; allotment of land in perpetual use to landless peasants; recognition of private ownership of small means of trade - fisherboats etc. up to 15 H.P.; small inns - to 10 rooms; private houses (to 175-220 sq. meters) etc.

One can be sure that Stalin took good care to make this new "Bill of Rights" known among all neighboring countries with a similar peasant-small house and ownership economic structure.

(b) Stalin first declaration of Nov. 1941 -renouncing intention of conquering other people's territory was strengthened by Russian-British pact of May 1942 and by Russia's recognition of the Atlantic Charter.

(c) Yesterday's reported appeal of Russia to Yugoslavian partisans to join forces with General Mikhailovitch.

3. The ~~very~~ success of Russian attitude causing her Balkan neighbors to join her may be utilized by Hitler to revive the "RED" red her-
ring, this time one of 300,000,000 Communist monster, including Czechoslovak munition industries and access to Mediterranean through the Balkans and encircling the Dardanelles. While retrenching behind its reduced frontiers Germany can then use her last Peace-
Blitz- that of offering peace in the name of the big German in-
dustrialists with a safe conduct for Hitler to leave Germany or to be permanently "retired", "or else"- A German Communist revolution - making England a neighbor to a 400,000,000 German-Russian-Balkan Communist Empire. *Thyssen is reported back in Hitler's grace & in a prominent position*

Pres. of Portugal

There were rumors that Schacht had been in contact with Salazar preparing ground for a peace offensive with Salazar as a go-between. Salazar's recent condemnations of the Nazi- as abusing and dis-
crediting an autocratic form of regime (which he thinks should be benevolent-autocratic) and of Communism, as an enemy of religion and family, was weighed heavier against Communism (incidentally- during the year preceding the war-Russia paid out something like a billion rubles bonuses to large families; so Salazar is mis-
informed and behind time).

I tried the 400,000,000 Red-red herring blitz on various people and found that it does frighten them! Hans Habe wrote to the same effect some time ago; he has married Ambassador Davis's daughter and so may have an entrée to an upper circle whose opinion is most feared by Russia. Even if such Blitz-Peace fails with Roosevelt and Churchill it will do much serious harm to Russia's slow maturing confidence in her relations with democracies so accelerated after the US. entry in the war. The danger is that Germans themselves may seriously believe in this; I heard from people who spoke to Germans in occupied France, that ^{the Germans} they were seriously astonished by the animosity they met; they were assured by the Fuehrer that they should be welcome as heroes-liberators, who shed their blood to save Europe from-

the Judeo-Communist menace.

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of continued unity with Russia and the need to help the Balkan revolution to break out as fast as possible, and not to have the Balkans feel that in war and in the after war reconstruction and reestablished commerce they have only the alternative of being dominated by either Germany or Russia.

Can anything be done?

Now that a United Strategic Council -as reported- will take in Russia and China, I think a lot can be done, as e.g. the following "talking aloud":

1. Irrespective of military plans which may require secrecy which prevailed e.g. in the African preparations, a special United Nations Balkan Council could be formed and the widest publicity given to it. With the active participation of Russia and concentration on the Balkan angle - various plans are bound to be devised.

2. Common action is more convincing than talking about it. Therefor in addition to all possible radio propaganda from US and England - one should devise activities -undertaken commonly with Russia and brought home to the Balkan people who are too remote and isolated from American-British influence, as the suggestions which follow:

vs malaria

3. One of such activities might be offer to send medical supplies to Bulgaria, especially QUININE. This offers possibilities of (a) doing it the way Greece is helped; (b) investigate if Russia which I believe is not at war with Bulgaria -could participate in this work with proper publicity in Bulgaria; (c) have the Swiss Govt. invite JAPAN to participate by shipping genuine quinine instead or in addition to American synthetic quinine - from Dutch East Indies; in the last case Japan may be asked to send sugar as well. Process of negotiations, success and failure should be widely spread.

4. A special United Nations Relief Office should be opened in countries as near Bulgari as possible, e.g. Syria, Palestine, Iraq. Efforts must be made to establish some kind of a branch in ANKARA, e.g. purchasing some Turkish supplies for relief of Bulgaria and the Balkans.

* Also Coffee and Tea, so important in the continental climate of Bulgaria and its Moslem traditions of drinking coffee vs. alcohol.

-4-

5. Greatest newspaper (and radio) publicity should be given in Turkey to plans of United Relief for the Balkans after the war, stressing some educational or spectacular angles which lend themselves to it, e.g. artificial insemination, selected seeds, sale of agricultural machinery on long term credit and without deposits, guaranteed purchase of certain crops so as to break fear of dependence on Germany after the war etc.

6. Use of the RUSSIAN-TIFLIS and other RADIO facilities for a joint campaign of propaganda for the Balkans. Americans must appear jointly with Britishers and the Russians on officially sponsored radio programs.

7. Revival of the TURKISH plans of the Black Sea economic Federation which, I understand, was very popular in Turkey several years ago. Turkish press may perhaps take up this revived plan without breaking its neutrality with Germany as the plan antedates the war. As I understand that plan intended to include Turkey, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece, but the 1934 pact resulted in a mutual guarantee of their territories by Turkey, Rumania, Greece and Yugoslavia, and so became directed against Bulgarian revisionism; Turkish press commented favorably on the Greek-Yugoslavian Confederation Pact (Jan. 1942); Periodic Balkan conferences should be attempted to be renewed - to be held in Turkey and to include Bulgaria, with the United Nations ready to listen to the Balkan States desires for territorial and economic guarantees and assistance.

8. Russia runs conventions of German, Austrian, Bohemian, Rumanian, Carpathian etc. prisoners of war and puts the Radio at their disposal for propaganda against Hitler, appealing to nationalism of the various countries. If it may seem not to come with good grades for England to participate in such program, there is all the more reason for the US to sponsor and participate in such programs IN RUSSIA on the Russian broadcasts, stressing the US participation.

Many reasons can be found against some or other or all of the above suggestion. One cannot get away, however, from the basic fact: WE MUST COOPERATE WITH RUSSIA EVEN IN THE FIELD OF PROPOGANDA AND HERE FOR BALKAN NATIONALIST REVOLUTIONS; WE MUST BE SPECIALLY ORGANIZED FOR THIS; UNITY WITH RUSSIA AND ACCELERATION OF BALKAN REVOLUTIONS MAY LEAD TO A COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF HITLER. THE OPPOSITE OF THESE - MAY MEAN A TRAGIC LOSS IN TIME AND MILLIONS OF ADDITIONAL HUMAN LIVES.